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SOME LESSONS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

(A tentative Analysis)

"Budapest is no longer merely the name of a city; henceforth it is a new and shining symbol of man's yearning to be free."
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Second Inaugural Address.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The popular uprising against the Communist dictatorship in Hungary, October - November 1956, has been the most dramatic -- and presumably the most effective -- blow inflicted upon the world Communist movement thus far. The official communist explanation, denouncing the uprising as "counterrevolution", "fascism" and "imperialist intervention", is obviously and outrageously wrong: but information thus far available to the West appears to be quite incomplete, is largely confined to isolated "surface" facts and admits a number of partly conflicting interpretations and conclusions.

2. We need a more comprehensive analysis of the Hungarian revolution, of its underlying origins and driving forces as well as of its role in contemporary history and of its significance for the immediate future. We need such an analysis, first of all, to counteract the world-wide Communist propaganda drive which distorts the truth, accuses the West and blackens the memory of the victims. But we need such an analysis also in order to derive from the Hungarian revolution whatever lessons we can learn which will assist us in our world-wide fight against Communism and for freedom. Finally, we need such an analysis to offer encouragement and realistic guidance to the active minorities in Hungary and in the other Satellite countries, in the Soviet Union and perhaps even in Communist China, who will continue to yearn for freedom, even after Moscow's terror has temporarily subdued the Hungarian revolution with ruthless brutality.

3. For these purposes, the present paper offers at least a working hypothesis. It is intended to stimulate discussion and to encourage intelligence collectors, interrogators, reports officers, researchers and analysts to obtain the missing facts, to confirm or to disprove the assumptions made here, and to lay thus the ground for a more definitive analysis to be prepared in the not too distant future.

B. CHARACTER AND ORIGIN

4. The Hungarian events became a true revolution, in every reasonable interpretation of this term -- and were not merely an uprising or a rebellion.

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They involved major portions of the entire country, not only a city or a district. The revolutionaries aimed at a complete change of the political, social and economic regime. They managed to paralyze the most vital economic activities of the country for weeks and they deprived the government of its power to rule -- a power which was restored only through the wholesale use of the Soviet Army. The revolutionary character of the events and the extent of popular participation are also expressed in the huge casualty figures: neutral observers [] estimated that 25 - 30,000 Hungarians -- plus several thousand Soviet soldiers -- were killed, for this small country of 9 million inhabitants a comparatively greater loss than the 300,000 dead of World War Two in the U.S.

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5. Three principal causes appear to have provided the basic motivations for this revolution. First, the spread of unrest and hope throughout the Soviet Orbit which began with the death of Stalin (unrest in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia, June 1953) and which intensified after the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956 (unrest in Soviet Georgia, Poznan riots, student movements in Prague and Moscow). These events encouraged the fierce nationalism which had characterized all of Hungary's modern history. Hungarians are no Slavs and have therefore no traditional basis for an understanding with Russia (unlike, for instance, the Czechs or the Bulgarians). On the contrary, Russians and Hungarians have clashed before, notably when the Tsarist Army helped to suppress the Hungarian revolution of 1848. In both World Wars, Hungarians and Russians fought on opposite sides. Nationalist symbols (the flag, the anthem, the coat of arms) played a significant role throughout the recent events.

6. The second cause was unquestionably economic. Hungary's limited resources were ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of the Soviet Union: M. Francois Fejto, Hungarian historian, suggests in a book, "The Hungarian Tragedy", just published in Paris, that this revolution would be known as the "Uranium Revolution", since the revelation of a secret agreement between the Rakosi regime and the Soviet Government, granting the latter the exclusive right to exploit the recently discovered uranium mines, is described as a major factor in touching off the uprising. The Communists had started a program of forcible industrialization in a country particularly ill suited for heavy industry (e.g. that they had built huge steel works for which both the coking coal and the iron ore had to be imported). Collectivized agriculture, too, was a total failure, causing constant food shortages in a country which was once a major food exporter and famous for its opulent cuisine.

7. The third cause -- and this is significantly different from other Satellite countries, notably from Poland, presumably also from Czechoslovakia -- was the inability of the Hungarian Communist Party to cope with the situation. That party was neither a power in its own right as, for instance, the Yugoslav CP, nor was it capable of absorbing the gathering momentum of nationalist unrest, as the Polish CP had succeeded in doing. When the storm broke, it proved unable to subdue it with the governmental, military or police forces under its own control, as the CPSU had repeatedly done, beginning with the Kronstadt uprising, 1921. The Hungarian CP was not even able either to monitor adequately or to interpret correctly the events leading to the revolution: that is, the party leaders presumably noticed the ferment but

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they underestimated its seriousness and expected to be able to cope with it. The same is apparently true of Moscow, judging from the shock of pained surprise and confusion with which the Soviet Government and the CPSU reacted to the first revolutionary events.

8. This last fact -- that Moscow, too, was taken by surprise -- causes us to inquire into the reasons for the failure of Moscow's own intelligence services -- of the Soviet Government, of the Red Army and of the CPSU -- to alert the top leaders in time. Has the downgrading of the R.I.S. since the execution of Beria lowered its efficiency? Have Hungarian agents proved disloyal to their Soviet masters? Did the revolution come so suddenly -- or were its preparations undertaken with such a high degree of security -- that even an efficient I.S. could not report on it (or penetrate it) until it was too late? Or were the reports simply disregarded by the Moscow top echelon, just as Stalin had disregarded the intelligence warnings about Hitler's impending attack in 1941?

9. The history of the Hungarian Communist Party helps to explain why the first full-scale revolution in the Soviet Orbit occurred in Hungary -- instead of in any of the other Satellite countries which in terms of industrialization, past democratic experiences or traditions of active hostility against Russia would have seemingly offered much better chances. The Hungarian CP started at the end of World War One, as in most European countries: but unlike most of the others, it did not gradually emerge from the radical, left, anti-war wing of the Social Democratic labor movement -- the way in which Communist Parties started in Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia or France. Instead, the Hungarian CP was organized by a small group of "brainwashed" prisoners of war, returning from Russian captivity under the leadership of Bela Kun and it plunged immediately into the short-lived, violent adventure of setting up a Soviet Republic.

10. This dictatorship, precariously established in the vacuum created by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and by the absence of strong democratic forces, was a desperate attempt to come to the aid of the isolated Russian Soviet Republic. The violence, senseless destruction and conflicts with neighboring countries which accompanied this coup and its end, gave Hungarians the first, bitter foretaste of Communism in practice. Bela Kun fled to Russia where he was liquidated during the great purges. There was never an effective Communist underground in Hungary. At the end of World War Two, the advancing Soviet Army imposed a few surviving Hungarian Communists, brought back from Russia, upon the defeated country. Even under strong Red Army pressure, the Hungarian CP polled only 17% of the popular vote in November 1945.

11. These fatal weaknesses were not remedied during ten years of post-war rule: the continued presence of Russian troops made it seem unnecessary for the Hungarian Communist leaders either to develop governmental strength of their own or to extend their party organization to the "grass roots", in order to support their dictatorial rule with an effective mass basis, a necessity which even a second-rate dictator like Peron understood better. It is unlikely that the Soviets

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intentionally kept the Hungarian CP weak and dependent; if this had been their guiding principle in dealing with Satellites, it would have shown in the other countries, too. Moreover, Stalin and his successors had every reason to trust Rakosi's loyalty -- as shown by Khrushchev's extreme reluctance to sacrifice Rakosi to Tito's insistent demands.

12. Lack of a mass basis also explains why the Hungarian regime, unlike other Communist governments, had to admit politically "unreliable" persons to sensitive positions, as army officers, senior government officials, engineers and skilled workers in key factories, etc. On paper, the Hungarian CP and its auxiliaries, the National Front, the trade unions, the Communist Youth League, etc., were hugely inflated mass organizations. But the percentage of true, devoted, trained Communists among these many hundreds of thousands of "paper soldiers" was so small that no really effective control was possible: therefore, as subsequent events have shown, the revolutionary cadres could mature under the very eyes of the cruel, but inefficient dictatorship.

C. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

13. Information thus far available makes us assume that the revolution was spontaneous. However, our information is not comprehensive enough to make this already a final, definitive conclusion. We have yet to investigate fully the possibility that there might have been some planned preparations in advance. If there were clandestine groups prior to 23 October and if some of their leaders or active members have since escaped to the West, they may have avoided any reference to such preparations in their public statements, for obvious security reasons. Intelligence debriefings of escaped revolutionaries, as reviewed prior to the writing of this paper, have not covered this question -- but it appears vitally important to obtain true, complete and detailed answers, not merely for the sake of historic accuracy but, far more important, for our guidance in future revolutionary situations against a Communist dictatorship.

14. There have been two major, middle-of-the-road political parties in Hungary, the Social Democrats and the Smallholders. Both had been compelled at the end of World War Two, under pressure by the Soviet Occupation Forces, to participate in the early stages of the "people's democratic" regime. In the 1945 elections, they had polled far more votes than the Communists. After the dictatorship seemed sufficiently consolidated, the two parties were gradually eliminated and their leaders -- apart from a few "collaborationists" -- either fled into exile, or were imprisoned or quietly removed from any political activity.

15. The Hungarian Communist regime had attempted already before October to bring certain non-Communist political leaders, especially Social Democrats, back into the government or at least into prominent positions in the National Front. At that time, this had looked like a rather ineffective application of the new popular front tactics,

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proclaimed at the 20th CPSU Congress and had no significant success whatsoever. In October, both parties emerged briefly into the open and negotiated with Imre Nagy about participation in a new government. There is, however, no evidence that either of these parties had maintained an effective underground organization during the years of Stalinist dictatorship, let alone that such an underground actually prepared the uprising.

16. A great deal of the visible fermentation which created the psychological atmosphere for the revolution took place in overt organizations of the regime, notably in writers', students' and youth organizations. Youth naturally resents regimentation more fiercely than their elders, especially in those European countries where there is traditional tension between the generations -- and Communist indoctrination of youth had been rather ineffective. Writers, on the other hand, have been the articulate vanguard of intellectual unrest in most modern revolutions. Such developments in these groups were possible because the CP did not effectively control any of these organizations, either in terms of ideological domination, or in terms of discipline and security supervision. There were oppositional discussions, demonstrations, resolutions. But available intelligence does not show that there were any clandestine preparations for an uprising in any of these groups.

17. The Communist claims that the uprising was engineered by a counterrevolutionary, fascist conspiracy, supported -- if not altogether initiated -- by the imperialist West, are contradicted by all factual evidence at hand. Of course, some individuals who took an active part in the revolution have a background in the days of the Horthy regime: for instance, army officers who joined the freedom fighters or provided them with weapons, have been officers in Horthy's army -- but they had been acceptable to the Communist regime, or else they would have not been retained in their military ranks. There is no indication, moreover, that these officers had formed a conspiracy intent upon restoring the autocratic regime of Horthy's "regency" or pursuing other truly counterrevolutionary or fascist aims.

18. Western propaganda -- broadcasts, leaflet balloons, mailings -- had been reaching Hungary to the same extent as they had reached the other Satellites. This propaganda had presumably helped to slow down and to weaken the consolidation of the Communist regime and had to a certain extent encouraged oppositional thoughts and hopes -- but it had not prepared or provoked the October uprising. Such preparation would have flagrantly contradicted the conviction shared by at least the U.S. and [redacted] by the vast majority of Western public opinion at large -- that peace-time revolutions against a Communist dictatorship were impossible and hopeless and could only lead to ghastly bloodshed and destruction.

19. There has been, to the best of our knowledge and belief, no contact between any anti-Communist Hungarian exile group -- or any other Western organization, official or unofficial -- and the revolutionary [redacted]

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forces inside the country (especially prior to 23 October) which might have involved any planning for the coming revolution, any training, any arms shipment, or the like. Some such contacts may have been established after the revolution had erupted into the open and such incidents may be exploited by the Communists-- especially, if they will hold show trials -- to prove their contention about the "counterrevolutionary" and "Western imperialist" origin of the uprisings. However, since any such contacts began only after the 23rd of October, they cannot have possibly inspired or caused the uprisings: they only attempted either to assist the revolution or to exploit it for their own political ends. Moreover, the few incidents of this kind thus far reported were all of comparatively low level and of limited scope and their significance must not be overestimated.

20. We conclude therefore -- at least tentatively and pending receipt of divergent information -- that the Hungarian revolution was generated spontaneously, that it had not been planned or prepared by any organization either inside or outside the country and that its actual outbreak surprised its active participants as much as the regime which it attacked or the foreign observers on either side of the Iron Curtain. This conclusion is strongly supported by the evidence: the revolutionaries did obviously not follow any preconceived plan, no effective central leadership emerged and a multitude of heterogeneous groups, apparently established at the spur of the moment, remained autonomous in their policies, tactics and leadership until the bitter end.

21. Despite this spontaneous, makeshift, uncoordinated character, the revolution wrested all real power from the Rakosi-Geroe regime and would undoubtedly have won a lasting victory, if it had not been for the massive military intervention of the Soviet Army. But the Soviet Army was present in strength, and the determination of the revolutionaries to attack its units, while proof of defiant heroism, betrays at the same time a fatal lack of the sober realism which has characterized all victorious revolutions. Even the limited, short-lived success of the uprising, however, appears to refute Lenin's doctrine that a revolution cannot be won without a rigidly centralized organization of professional revolutionaries -- a doctrine which the West had unquestioningly accepted as valid. And since no centralized clandestine organization was expected to survive under a totalitarian dictatorship, the West had virtually abandoned hope for any victorious uprising inside the Sino-Soviet Orbit.

22. Incidentally, this assumption may have been strongly influenced by the experience with Hitler's totalitarian dictatorship, the only one of its kind which we have been able to study from its beginning to the very end: the few internal uprisings in the Nazi empire were ruthlessly quelled and a World War was required to bring Hitler's rule to its downfall. But Hitler, at the time he unleashed World War Two, was far from having reached the "saturation point" which the Soviet Empire reached

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at the time of Stalin's death, if not already at the end of World War Two. Our experience with Hitler did not cover the "advanced" phases of a totalitarian dictatorship which we now observe in the Sino-Soviet Orbit -- since he took a "short-cut" to oblivion which Stalin was able to avoid. If the Nazi empire had managed to survive 40 years like the Soviet Union, we might have witnessed successful uprisings against Hitler's heirs, too.

23. The lack of a centralized revolutionary organization prior to the open uprisings may even be considered one of the most significant reasons for the initial successes of the Hungarian revolution. The absence of such an organization insured complete surprise. It made it impossible for the internal security agencies to penetrate the revolutionary organizations (while even Lenin's Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had been penetrated by the Tsarist Okhrana). The lack of such an organization also prevented "leaks" from among the conspirators or any of the advance dissensions which have beset most revolutionary movements.

D. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

24. In the first phase of the uprising, paramilitary action was predominant; in the second phase -- after the massive development of Soviet troops made open streetfighting increasingly hopeless --, emphasis shifted to strikes and other forms of non-violent resistance in the cities accompanied by guerilla action in forests and mountains. During both phases, there was propaganda through all available media and political action on every level.

25. In the streetfighting in Budapest, the Hungarian revolutionaries performed not only with reckless courage but also with unexpected technical skill: as shown by the ratio of Russian to Hungarian casualties, the number of Soviet tanks and guns destroyed or captured, and the length of revolutionary resistance against crushing Red Army superiority in weapons and numbers. We had always assumed that resistance forces must be given large-scale training and must be equipped from the outside before they can engage in active operations-- an assumption largely based on our experiences with resistance movements during World War Two. In Hungary, however, there were apparently enough revolutionaries who either were war veterans or had received paramilitary training by the Communists themselves -- especially in Communist youth and students groups. They obtained ample arms and ammunition either from surrendering units of the Hungarian armed forces, or from the workers in armament plants, or by seizing police and military stores.

26. This remarkable paramilitary performance may have been somewhat facilitated by the attitude of the Russian garrison troops who confronted the revolutionaries in the first days of the fighting and who apparently did not relish the task of killing civilians, including women and children, among whom they had lived for some time. Reports of refusals to fight and of defections among these troops are contradictory and incomplete, but there is no doubt that the military repression got underway only after

those garrison troops had been replaced by numerous new Red Army units, hastily transported into Hungary and reported to have been composed largely of Asiatic troops.

27. These general facts of the fighting are already very significant: however, if we are really to learn from the Hungarian revolution, we need many more details and a far more searching analysis of the tactics and techniques of the fighting. Were the heavy initial losses of the Soviet forces inevitable, were they due to low morale, to faulty leadership or to superior tactics on the part of the revolutionaries or could they have been caused by any original intention of the Soviets to restrict bloodshed and military action as much as possible? How does the streetfighting in Budapest compare with other recent instances of an armed uprising against superior military forces, such as the Warsaw uprising against the Nazi in 1944 or the battle of Madrid in the Spanish Civil War? Would better training, better organization, better equipment of the revolutionaries have materially affected the outcome -- and how? In other words, we need professional, detached critiques of the fighting, from the viewpoint of both the military expert and the professional revolutionary.

28. The strikes and the formation of workers' councils, first in the factories but later also on a regional and even nation-wide level, were equally surprising. We had always assumed that labor unions in a Communist state are rigidly controlled by the Communist Party and Government and that they can never be turned into a revolutionary instrument -- but this assumption has been effectively refuted in Hungary (and, to a certain extent, also in Poland). The general strike succeeded in paralyzing the country, its transportation services and its essential industrial production, including public utilities. Some of the strikes broke out spontaneously, others seem to have been organized by the unions whose Communist control may have been merely nominal from the beginning or whose party bosses had gone into hiding, leaving the organizations to the workers themselves.

29. The revolutionaries engaged in active psychological warfare from the very beginning. An attack on the Budapest radio station was one of the first overt acts. Several regional stations served the revolutionary cause for weeks (see also the documentary publication of the Free Europe Committee, "The Revolt in Hungary", covering the period from 23 October to 9 November 1956). Revolutionary groups published newspapers, leaflets and posters and their views were echoed in the "official" press, too. These publications were apparently produced more or less overtly, during the days when the revolutionaries controlled most of the country and even later, before complete and effective controls by the Red Army and their puppet dictatorship had been restored.

30. It would be important to discover whether there had been any clandestine publications or radio stations inside Hungary prior to 23 October or whether any revolutionary groups continued to use clandestine presses or clandestine transmitters after they had been driven off the overt media by Soviet military force. These questions will have to be answered in close

connection with the broader question of planned preparations for the uprising and of the more or less underground continuation of revolutionary activities, after the open streetfighting, the open demonstrations, etc. had become impossible.

31. At the same time, we ought to know more about the relationship between all propaganda efforts, overt or clandestine -- of both the revolutionaries and of the opposing Communist regime -- on the one hand and the political and military events on the other hand: did propaganda provoke military action or was it merely "background music" to a chain of events which would have taken place in any case? In line with our assumptions about the spontaneous character of the revolution, there is reason to believe that the basic nationalistic, anti-Russian and anti-Communist emotions were decisive and that any manipulation by a deliberate propaganda effort rather secondary. Here again, we ought to know more. It is, for instance, safe to assume that the propagandists who were active during the uprising -- inside or outside the country -- contributed substantially more than mere news and commentary. The more precisely we can establish the true role of propaganda in the Hungarian revolution (how much of it was "cause" and how much "effect", or even mere "side show" and why), the better for our propaganda efforts not only aimed at denied areas, but everywhere.

E. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

32. Many, far too many pieces of the puzzle are still missing (or unidentified), as the foregoing discussion proves. It is therefore too early to arrive at final, binding and definitive conclusions. However, while continuing to hunt for the missing pieces, we must already have at least a working hypothesis, to guide our day-by-day interpretation of the Hungarian events and our operational efforts against the Soviet Orbit and against World Communism at large. Such a working hypothesis is outlined below.

33. Any effort to interpret the Hungarian revolution might be based on a close comparison with the Russian Revolution of 1905. It is understood that the drawing of this historic parallel does not imply that the two events are fully identical. The Russian Revolution arose primarily from social and constitutional grounds, while the Hungarian revolution was essentially a fight for national independence. In the Russian Revolution, people were largely divided according to class lines: industrial workers and revolutionary intelligentsia against the ruling minority of the semi-feudal Tsarist regime; in Hungary, it was virtually the entire people against a foreign oppressor and his indigenous minions. But despite these and other differences, we cannot help noticing a surprising degree of close similarity.

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34. In both cases, the initial impulse was provoked by external events: 1905, Japan's victory over the armed forces of the Tsar -- 1956, the "de-Stalinization" which began formally with the 20 CPSU Congress in Moscow. In both cases, the most dangerous weapon of the revolutionaries was the mass strike and the forming of workers councils "from the grass roots up". In both cases, the government felt initially too weak to subdue the revolution by brute force and made seemingly far-reaching concessions to purchase time -- 1905, in order to bring combat troops back from the Far East, 1956, to bring new Soviet Divisions into Hungary. In both cases the government abandoned any pretense of negotiations as soon as it again felt strong enough to suppress the revolution by force, canceled all concessions (including some of those made prior to the actual outbreak) and took revenge for its temporary defeat by excessive severity and brutality in the latter stages of the repression. In both cases, the revolutionaries were comparatively inexperienced, lacking unity of organization or of purpose and were split into a variety of ideological and regional groups and factions.

35. The Government against which the Russian revolution of 1905 arose was, of course, the Imperial Government of the Tsar and the Communists were on the side of the revolutionaries. In 1956, the Russian Communists were the government against which the revolution was aimed: worse still, they were the government of Imperial Russia, ruling Hungary like a colony, and bringing in Russian troops after their Hungarian puppets had proven utterly incapable of controlling the situation. Since the Communists still pretend to be revolutionaries and to combat imperialism and colonialism -- their most effective pretense outside the Orbit, especially in neutralist Asia and the Middle East --, they felt (and continue to feel) exceedingly uncomfortable in this repressive role, just as they felt very uncomfortable in June 1953, when the impotence of their East German puppets forced them to commit armored divisions of the Red Army against striking and demonstrating workers.

36. Their hysterical screams about "counterrevolutionary conspiracy" and "imperialist plot" must not be allowed to obscure the truth that the Communist dictatorship stands in 1956 (presumably not only in Hungary, but also, in varying degrees, in the other Satellites, if not in the Soviet Union itself), where the Tsarist regime stood in 1905. A reactionary police state, ruled by a narrow upper caste of bureaucrats, militarists and managers, separated by an unbridgeable gulf from the broad masses of the people, from workers and peasants and even from the youth which has been educated under the close control of the regime.

37. This gives us -- and the peoples who continue to suffer under Communist rule -- the courage of the conviction that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, though drowned in blood, has not been in vain, just as the Russian revolution of 1905 retained its tremendous historic significance, despite its complete defeat. The Tsarist regime refused to learn the lessons of 1905 and was therefore totally destroyed only twelve years later. The Communist rulers of today seem equally unable and unwilling to learn their lessons: every day now, we see them reviving the worst features of Stalinist terrorism to crush the last sparks of Hungarian unrest. The revolution of 1917 did not follow "automatically" the

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revolution of 1905: external events such as World War One and the internal factors, including the underground activities of the Bolshevik Party contributed to bring it about. We cannot anticipate any "automatic" end of Soviet-Communist rule, either, but have to consider the factors which are likely to cause it, including our own possible contributions.

38. We need hardly worry whether the suppression of the Hungarian revolution makes future uprisings -- in Hungary, in other Satellites or in the Soviet Union itself -- "impossible". The Hungarian revolution occurred even though we had assumed that "it could not happen there" and it seems logical to concede that future uprisings may occur anywhere in the Orbit. However, before this happens, the Communist empire might plunge us into World War Three -- deliberately or inadvertently -- just as Hitler caused World War Two. There is, to be sure, the significant difference (noted in para 22 above) that Hitler started that war six years after he had come to power, that is, at a stage where no potential revolutionary forces inside his empire had developed -- while the Soviet Orbit has already reached a much later state than the Nazi Reich ever attained. And if World War Three does not materialize and "October 1917" comes in Hungary or throughout the Soviet empire: might not the ultimate victor be an "anti-Communist Lenin" and might not the cure be even worse than the disease?

39. The question whether revolutionary moves increase the danger of war leads us also to study the interrelationship between the Hungarian events and British-French military action in Egypt. If it had not been for that action, Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution might have come less abruptly, since the Soviet rulers would have undoubtedly preferred to build a better cover for their imperialist intervention which hurt their cause throughout the world. The events in Egypt appear to have given them the impression that they would have to fight a major war almost immediately. Nasser's defeat as the result of military action, after all Soviet promises of support, after their huge arms shipments, etc. would have meant a fatal loss of face for the Soviets, not only in the Arab countries, but throughout the Asian-African nations -- that is, it would have blocked Moscow's chances for expansion in almost every conceivable direction. Such a prospect is obviously unacceptable to any dictatorship. However, in the long run, the Soviets would have suppressed the Hungarian revolution by military force (the only force left to them there) in any case, even without the Egyptian crisis. The threat of a major war did not originate in Hungary.

40. The emergence of an "anti-Communist Lenin" -- i.e., a leader of an anti-Soviet movement which would replace Moscow's present dictatorship with another type of aggressive, totalitarian rule, whether reminiscent of Fascism or establishing an entirely new "ism" -- is a possibility deserving careful study. In every revolution, the radical extremists have an advantage over the moderates: the Jacobins over the Girondists, Lenin over Kerensky. In World War Two, the Western powers were forced to support dictator Stalin against the aggressor,

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dictator Hitler: we defeated Hitler, but we did not win the peace. Any long-range analysis of revolutionary movements in the Soviet Orbit ought to keep in mind that the enemies of our enemies are not necessarily or automatically our real friends. It should be understood, however, that any development which breaks up the present "monolithic unity" of the Sino-Soviet Orbit is likely to be in the interest of the West, even if the political regimes in the several, no longer united countries are individually "unfriendly". For the same reason, we have considered Titoism a development in our favor, not because Tito's brand of Communism is necessarily "better", but because he weakened the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc.

41. If we convey our interpretation of the Hungarian revolution -- and of developments in the Soviet Orbit and in world affairs at large -- to the leaders or potential leaders and activists of the Anti-Communist revolutionary forces on either side of the Iron Curtain, if we establish a (necessarily covert) working relationship with these forces, thereby encouraging ideas of freedom, democracy and international cooperation, we might be able to assist the forming of a "new order" in that part of the world which would be compatible with world peace and our country's legitimate interests. Such a "new order" might be quite different from our traditions of parliamentary democracy, but it might eliminate -- or at least reduce -- the danger of an "anti-Communist Lenin" or of any new form of aggressive dictatorial rule taking the place of the present Soviet System.

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